Abstract. At top energy (proton momentum 7 TeV/c) with nominal beam parameters, each of the two LHC proton beams has a stored energy of 350 MJ threatening to damage accelerator equipment in case of accidental beam loss. It is essential that the beams are properly extracted onto the dump blocks in case of failure since these are the only elements that can withstand full beam impact. Although the energy stored in the beams at injection (450 GeV/c) is about 15 times smaller compared to top energy, the beams must still be properly extracted in case of large accidental beam losses. Failures must be detected at a sufficiently early stage and initiate a beam dump. Quenches and power converter failures will be detected by monitoring the correct functioning of the hardware systems. In addition, safe operation throughout the cycle requires the use of beam loss monitors, collimators and absorbers. Ideas of detection of fast beam current decay, monitoring of fast beam position changes and monitoring of fast magnet current changes are discussed, to provide the required redundancy for machine protection.
INTRODUCTION
Protection in high power / high stored energy accelerators became a topic of intense research during the last years [1] . The beam power increases (e.g. SNS), beams become extremely bright (future linear colliders), and both the momentum and the beam intensity increases to unprecedented values (LHC). In accelerators with high power, continuous beam losses must be kept under control to limit radiation exposure of components. Injection must be stopped immediately after any failure. For accelerators with high stored beam and magnet energy, this energy must be safely discharged at the end of a fill or after a failure.
For the LHC, the operation with large stored energy in the beams in the presence of superconducting magnets with a very low quench margin is a particular challenge.
The complexity of the accelerator is unprecedented. More than 10000 magnets are powered in 1612 electrical circuits. The superconducting magnets require complex cryogenics and vacuum systems etc. Repair of damaged equipment could take long, for example, the exchange of a superconducting magnet would take about 30 days.
The first priority for the protection systems is to prevent equipment damage. The second priority is to protect superconducting magnets from quenching. The protection systems should only dump the beam when necessary. False beam dumps should be avoided. In case of beam dumps, complete and reliable diagnostics data should be provided, including post-mortem recording.
PROTECTION FOR SUPERCONDUCTING ACCELERATORS
The protection systems [2] for LHC are similar to other accelerators with superconducting magnets (HERA, TEVATRON, RHIC).
At the end of a fill and after a failure, the beam is deflected into a specially designed target (beam dump block) thus discharging the energy. Beam cleaning with collimators limits particle losses around the accelerator. Three of the eight LHC insertions are foreseen for protection, two for beam cleaning and one for the two beam dumping systems [3] . The magnets in the two cleaning insertions are normal-conducting. One insertion has collimators capturing protons with large betatron amplitudes and the other insertion has collimators in locations with non-zero dispersion catching protons with large momentum deviations. Beam loss monitors are installed at each quadrupole and other aperture limitations around the machine. Additional collimators and beam absorbers are installed in most other insertions and in the transfer lines from the SPS (used as injector) to the LHC.
ENERGY IN MAGNETS AND BEAMS
To deliver proton-proton collisions at a centre of mass energy of 14 TeV with a nominal luminosity of 10 34 cm -2 s -1 , the LHC will operate with high-field dipole magnets using NbTi superconductors cooled with helium at 1.9 K [4] . Some parameters for the LHC as proton collider are given in Table 1 . Whereas the proton momentum is between a factor of 7 and 15 higher than in SPS, Tevatron or HERA, the energy stored in the beams is more than a factor of 100 higher.
The transverse energy density as relevant factor for equipment damage is 1000 times higher than for other accelerators.
At 7 TeV superconducting magnets could quench in case of fast beam losses of 10 -8 -10 -7 of the nominal beam intensity (see Table 2 [5] [6] ). This is orders of magnitude lower than for other accelerators and requires very efficient beam cleaning.
Uncontrolled release of even a small fraction of the beam energy could cause serious damage to equipment. The beam intensity that could damage equipment depends on the beam impact parameters and on the type of equipment hit by the beam and is not easy to predict. Approximate values are given in Table 2 . The values will be further refined in the near future from simulations and in a dedicated experiment at the SPS.
COLLIMATORS AND APERTURE
The LHC will be the first machine requiring collimators to define the mechanical aperture through the entire cycle. A sophisticated scheme with many collimators and beam absorbers has been designed [3] :
• Collimators for cleaning the beam halo must be adjusted between 5-10 σ to the beam centre; within a fraction of one σ (σ is the rms beam size).
• Beam absorbers for protection of equipment during injection and extraction should shadow equipment downstream and must be adjusted within one σ. Their position depends on the operational mode (injection, energy ramp,…) and on the optics. • Collimators for protection and cleaning of the low-beta insertions, mainly in IR1 and IR5, complement the protection and must be accurately adjusted (within about one σ), mainly for operation with squeezed beams. The aperture of the LHC at 450 GeV is limited (about 7.5 σ, assuming closed orbit excursions of 4 mm, β-beating, misalignment, ...). Operation is most critical at 7 TeV with squeezed optics. The β-functions are up to 4850 m in insertions IR1 and IR5. The optics requires very strong low-β quadrupole magnets. In the insertions, normal conducting and superconducting dipole magnets separate the two beams. Due to the crossing angle, there is a considerable orbit offset in the low-β quadrupoles. For luminosity operation at 7 TeV, the opening between two collimator jaws can be as small as 2.2 mm.
Under optimum conditions the single beam lifetime could exceed, say, 100 h. The beam deposited power into the equipment is about 1 kW and requires the cleaning system to capture more than 99 % of the losses. If the lifetime decreases to 10 h, the collimators should capture more than 99.9 % of the beam losses [7] . The collimation system is designed to accept beams with a lifetime of down to about 0.2 h for a 10 s long transient, e.g. when changing the betatron tune (for nominal current at 7 TeV). This corresponds to a power deposition of 500 kW. If the lifetime becomes even smaller, in particular after equipment failure, the beams will have to be dumped immediately. Depending on the type of failure, dumping the beams must be very fast. At injection energy, or with less beam current, beam lifetimes that are lower than 0.2 hours are acceptable. 
ACCIDENTAL BEAM LOSSES AND PROTECTION
Since it is not conceivable to consider all possible failures, mechanisms for particle losses are classified according to the time constant for the loss [7] .
Ultrafast beam losses are losses in a single turn or less. Multiturn losses include very fast losses in less than 5 ms, fast losses in more than 5 ms and steady losses (one second or more).
Ultrafast beam losses
One mechanism for such losses is a wrong deflection of the circulating beam, by an injection kicker, beam dump kicker or a kicker for tune measurements and aperture exploration. Another mechanism is a failure during transfer and injection, such as a wrong trajectory or wrong energy of the injected beam, or the physical obstruction of the beam passage.
The probability for kicker failures is minimised using very reliable systems, and by interlocking kicker magnets. However, erratic firing of a kicker cannot be fully excluded. Strategies for protection are:
• designing systems with high reliability.
• blocking beam transfer from SPS to LHC if parameters are not correct (i.e. magnet current) by an interlock system. • relying on collimators and beam absorbers for passive protection.
Multiturn failures (fast / very fast beam losses)
Protection relies on detecting the failure and dumping the beams. Detection, transmission to beam dump, and beam dump takes at least 3 turns (~ 270 µs).
Failures that could drive the beam unstable are mainly quenches of superconducting magnets and failures in the powering system. Combined failures may occur, for example after mains disturbances due to thunderstorms. There is also a class of operational failures (betatron tune moving on a resonance, wrong chromaticity adjustments,…)
Failures could lead to fast closed orbit growth around the ring, to fast emittance growth and explosion of the beam size. The consequences can be detected everywhere around the accelerator.
Local orbit bumps cannot occur very fast but might be detected only locally.
Objects could move into the beams, such as vacuum valves, collimators or other elements. There could also be a loss of beam vacuum. Failure in the RF system would lead to debunching of the beam. The number of protons in the abort gap would increase.
In [8] several failures were considered. A failure of the normal conducting separation dipole magnets is the most critical failure and leads to a fast change of the closed orbit around the accelerator. Protons in the tails of the distribution would first touch collimator jaws, exceeding more than 10 9 protons after about 15 turns. The losses can be detected by beam loss monitors. Assuming that the collimators can withstand a beam loss of about 10 12 protons, the jaws could be damaged already after 30 turns. Therefore the beam should be dumped within about 10 turns (1 ms).
After a dipole magnet quench, the beam should be dumped before the magnetic field starts to decay.
FAILURES AND BEAM DUMP REQUESTS
For most failures leading to accidental beam losses, more than one system will detect the failure and request a beam dump. For instance when a magnet quenches, the quench detection system issues a beam dump request. If the beam is not dumped before the magnetic field decreases, the beam position might change. The beam position monitors would detect this change and issue a dump request. Beam loss monitors would detect beam losses when protons touch the aperture and issue a beam dump request. When part of the beam is lost, the fast beam current decay monitor would also issue a beam dump request.
Hardware diagnostics
For many systems the correct functioning of the hardware is monitored, and a beam dump request is issued in case of hardware failures:
• Vacuum valve or other movable devices leaving the "OUT" position and moving towards the beam • Failure detected by a power converter (typical detection time > 10 ms).
• Cooling failure for normal conducting magnets.
• Failure in the RF system.
• Anticipated failure in the beam dumping system (example: if one out of 15 extraction kicker fails, the beam would be dumped since 14 kickers would still ensure a clean beam dump).
• Failure in critical beam absorbers and collimators.
Quench signal from Quench Protection System
Normally, the beam loss monitors should request a beam dump before a magnet would quench. However, to address the reliability of the protection systems, it is assumed that a main magnet quenches. When the resistive voltage across the magnet exceeds 0.1 V for 10 ms, the quench heaters are fired, the energy extraction starts and beam dump request is issued [9] . The interlock system transmits the request to the beam dumping system. The beam dump kicker extracts the beam. Due to the opening of the extraction switch, the current starts to decay exponentially. When the voltage across the magnet exceeds about 6 V, the current starts to bypass the magnet via a diode. Since it takes some time until the quench heaters become effective and the extraction switch opens, the beam is normally dumped before the magnetic field decays.
Strong points
• Does not require correct collimator settings.
• In general, the beam is dumped before the magnetic field decays.
• The beam is dumped for failures of the quench protection system.
• The system will be operational long before start of beam operation.
Weak points
• Covers only beam losses due to quenches and failures in the quench protection system. • The efficiency depends on quench process, magnet field, beam loss pattern, etc. It is not guaranteed that the beam dump comes in time.
• Large complexity (several 1000 channels).
Adequate tools for the analysis of the transient data recorded are required.
Beam loss monitors at collimators and other aperture limitations
Beam loss monitors installed at all aperture restrictions will continuously monitor particle losses, detecting accidental beam loss within less than one turn. Normally collimators are limiting the aperture. When the emittance grows, losses will always occur at collimators. For a fast growth of the closed orbit, the orbit amplitude depends on the phase between the accidental deflection and the collimators. Since the mechanical aperture at 450 GeV is only slightly larger than the collimator opening, it cannot be excluded that the beam touches another element before touching a collimator jaw.
Strong points
• The system should capture (nearly) all types of accidental beam losses.
• The reaction time is short.
• The complexity is limited (some 100 channels).
• The system has been designed to be very reliable.
Weak points
• To be efficient, the system requires collimators defining the aperture.
• Such BLMs might not detect beam losses in the arcs (for example, due to closed orbit bumps).
• Random spikes induced by beam loss might give false triggers.
Beam loss monitors in the arcs
Together with the BLMs at aperture limitations the system covers the entire accelerator, detecting beam loss within less than one turn.
Strong points
• Independent of collimators settings.
• Catches failures that appear only in the arcs (for example due to closed bump).
Weak points
• Could increase number of false beam dumps.
Magnet current change monitors
Such monitors are used for very fast detection of power converter and magnet failures. The change of magnet current is monitored by measuring the magnetic field with Hall probes or by measuring the inductive voltage or directly the output voltage of the power converter [10] . It should be possible to detect powering failures in less than one millisecond. A prototype gave promising results. A similar technique has been recently successfully implemented at HERA.
Strong points
• Independent method to monitor powering failures.
• Should detect consequences of thunderstorms.
• Can be made fast (< 1ms).
Weak points
• Needs to be demonstrated if practical (EMC, …) -wait for HERA experience.
• Should be limited to a few electrical circuits with normal conducting magnets -otherwise too complex.
• Some development required.
Beam position change monitors
To cover the full phase space, for each beam and each plane two monitors with 90 degrees phase advance are required, in total 8 BPMs. The BPMs are installed at location of high beta function, using the monitors already planned to ensure maximum closed orbit amplitudes of 3.6 mm in the insertion IR6 for clean extraction into the extraction channel.
At 450 GeV, the fastest orbit movement during normal operation by an orbit corrector magnet is in the order of some mm/s. At 7 TeV the fastest movement is less than 1 mm/s. If the change of the orbit exceeds substantially these values, the beam will be dumped.
Strong points
• Direct method to measure fast orbit drifts.
• Can be made very fast (< 1ms).
• Beam dump before particles are lost.
• System with limited complexity.
Weak points
• It needs to be demonstrated that such system is practical and does not induce false beam dumps.
• The system should not react on deliberate or unavoidable orbit changes (kicks, injection, ..).
• Not for emittance growth or slow orbit drifts.
Beam current decay measurements
The damage limit of material such as copper or stainless steel is in the order of some 10 12 protons for transient beam impact at 450 GeV, and in the order of 10 10 at 7 TeV (see table 2 ). At 450 GeV, a monitor that safely detects a loss of 10 12 protons within a short time (between one turn and one millisecond) could dump the beam preventing any beam induced damage, independent of collimator positions. At 7 TeV a loss of 10 12 protons could damage equipment. If the collimators are shadowing the aperture and the protons are lost at graphite collimators, the beam would be dumped without causing damage. If 10 12 protons are lost elsewhere, some damage would occur, but detection and subsequent beam dump would limit the damage. If the sensitivity of the monitor is ten times better (detection of 10 11 protons), there would be still some risk of damaging equipment. For detecting a loss of 10 10 protons the risk is further reduced. Detecting a loss of 10 9 protons would always protect the machine.
Strong points
• Independent method of beam loss measurement.
• Fast for reduced accuracy (<1ms).
• Slow for high accuracy (>10ms).
• Only one instrument per beam.
Weak points
• Needs to be demonstrated if practical.
• Not sufficient for all LHC operation modes and for the shortest accidental beam losses time constants, in particular at 7 TeV).
CONCLUSIONS
Novel ideas for detecting failures on the time scale of less than one millisecond will be pursued, by hardware monitoring as well as by beam monitoring. Recently, beam losses on this timescale became of concern for HERA [11] . This observation is a strong incentive to pursue these ideas.
Redundancy in the protection will ensure the required reliability in protecting the LHC. Availability and maintainability of the machine due to the complex protection are issues deserving much attention. The setting of thresholds for many of the protection systems is delicate (beam loss monitors, beam current decay monitors and magnet current decay monitors). If a threshold is too low this could result in false beam dumps (beam dumps that are not strictly necessary). If the threshold is too high, there is the risk of damage.
Due to the large energy stored in magnets and beams stringent protection is required: too few interlocks could lead to important damage of LHC components. This requires an unprecedented complexity of the machine protection system, but too many interlocks could prevent the LHC from operating efficiently.
